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The « Added Value » of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in the Ambit of Religious Freedom and Religious 
Autonomy in Belgian Constitutional Case Law 
 
Stéphanie WATTIER 
Chargée d’enseignement et chercheuse à l’Université de Namur, chargée de 
recherche honoraire du F.RS.-FNRS à l’Université catholique de Louvain 
Abstract 
This paper sheds light on the « added value » of the case law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the ambit of religious freedom 
and religious autonomy in Belgian Constitutional case law with the help of 
concrete examples. 
Introduction 
As the principal legal source of human rights protection in Belgium 
since 1831, the Constitution forms the basis for freedom of religion and the 
« mutual independence » of State and Church. The specific provisions 
relating to religion contained in the Belgian Constitution constitute a 
paradigmatic example of compromise: they are the result of the discussions 
that took place between Catholic and Liberal members of the National 
Congress in 1830-1831. In that sense, the Belgian Constitution is – as are 
most constitutions – manifestly coloured by its particular history and values it 
embodies, especially concerning the regulation of religion (Articles 19, 20, 
21 and 181). For instance, it bears noting that the National Congress 
decided to fix the public funding of religious ministers in the Constitution 
itself (old Article 1171) as a consequence of the influence of the funding that 
already existed when Belgian territories were subject to the rule of the 
Austrian Netherlands, the French Republic and the Netherlands. 
In the same vein, again because they are coloured by the particular 
history and values of a given society, Constitutions generally ensure a more 
efficient protection of rights in the State concerned. In Belgium this is – 
amongst others – true of Article 14bis of the Constitution that prohibits 
capital punishment compared, for instance, to the European Convention on 
                                                
1 Now Article 181 of the Constitution. 
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Human Rights that still tolerates it2. It is also true of Article 22bis that 
guarantees the respect of moral, physical, mental and sexual integrity of 
every child. However, that finding does not apply to freedom of religion and 
religious autonomy. Indeed, as this paper will show, Articles of the Belgian 
Constitution dedicated to religious matters have not been modified since 
1831, which explains why the Constitutional Court regularly relies upon the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights to « modernise » its 
interpretation of those Articles. 
After a (very) general overview of the principles of religious freedom 
and religious autonomy (1), this paper will focus upon the status of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in Belgian Constitutional Law (2) 
and, with the help of concrete examples, will analyse the influence of 
Strasbourg cases on Belgian Constitutional case law in the ambit of religious 
freedom and religious autonomy (3) compared to the case law of the Belgian 
Court of Cassation and Council of State (4). 
1. Religious freedom and religious autonomy: general overview 
In Belgian law at least3 two human rights instruments must be taken 
into consideration in order to analyse the scope of religious freedom and 
religious autonomy: on the one hand, the Belgian Constitution (A) and on the 
other hand, the European Convention on Human Rights (B). 
A. The Scope of Articles 19 to 21 of the Belgian Constitution 
1. The Scope of the Constitution of 1831: A Spirit of 
Compromise 
Since its very inception in 1831 – shortly after the State became 
independent in 1830 – and in the vein of numerous national and international 
human rights instruments, the Belgian Constitution has formed the basis for 
freedom of religion in Belgium. More precisely, Article 19 provides that 
« freedom of worship, its public practice and freedom to demonstrate one’s 
opinions on all matters are guaranteed, but offences committed when this 
freedom is used may be punished ». 
                                                
2 However see: Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances 
3 We could also point out the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, in the present paper, the analysis is limited 
to the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights because of the 
importance given to the Strasbourg jurisprudence in Belgian constitutional case-law. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






































































                        D
ocum











Stéphanie Wattier                      R.I.E.J., 2016.77  
 299 
Since its creation, even if the text does not explicitly state it, the 
Constitution has also formed the basis for religious autonomy. More 
precisely, Article 21 § 1 ensures that « the State does not have the right to 
intervene either in the appointment or in the installation of ministers of any 
religion whatsoever or to forbid these ministers from corresponding with their 
superiors, from publishing the acts of these superiors, but, in this latter case, 
normal responsibilities as regards the press and publishing apply ». Legal 
literature and jurisprudence consider that Article 21 § 1 of the Constitution 
contains a general principle of prohibition on State intervention in religious 
affairs. In other words, as explained by Rik Torfs, « Article 21 of the Belgian 
Constitution always has been perceived as a pars pro toto. It does not 
exclusively deal with correspondence or with the appointment of ministers. 
On the contrary, freedom of internal organisation and autonomy as a? whole 
are at stake »4. 
Article 20 of the Constitution must also be mentioned. By providing 
that « no one can be obliged to contribute in any way whatsoever to the acts 
and ceremonies of a religion or to observe its days of rest », Article 20 is the 
« negative » counterpart to Article 19. 
In 1831, Articles 19, 20 and 21 very well reflected the position of the 
Parliament and the population vis-à-vis religious phenomena. In broad 
terms, the Constitution of 1831 was a compromise between Catholic 
members of the National Congress – who wanted freedom of religion and 
autonomy of churches (Articles 19 and 21) – and Liberals who wanted the 
right not to be obliged to believe in or manifest membership of any religion 
(Article 20) and the priority of civil over religious marriage ceremonies 
(Article 21, § 25).  
2. The Scope of Today’s Constitution: A Lack of Modernity? 
If Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Constitution corresponded perfectly to 
the social and religious realities of the nineteenth century, today they are 
more questionable. One of the most intriguing aspects is the total absence of 
any possibility of limiting or restricting those rights. It is understood that 
Articles 19 to 21 are only based on a repressive logic, in opposition, for 
instance, to the European Convention on Human Rights that is based on a 
preventive logic6. 
                                                
4 R. TORFS, « Church Autonomy in Belgium », in Church Autonomy: a Comparative 
Survey, G. Robbers (dir.), Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2001, p. 608.  
5 More precisely, Article 21, sub. 2, of the Constitution provides that « A civil wedding 
should always precede the blessing of the marriage, apart from the exceptions to be 
established by the law if needed ».  
6 See below point B.  
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In line with this problem, two constitutionalists – Jan Velaers and 
Sébastien van Drooghenbroeck – were invited as experts by the Belgian 
Federal Parliament in 2004 to propose a modernisation of Title II of the 
Constitution entitled « Belgians and their rights »7 (which includes, amongst 
others, Articles 19, 20 and 21). In two final documents containing more than 
500 pages, the two constitutionalists’ proposals included « cross-cutting 
clauses »8 for the authorisation of limitations on human rights (very similar to 
those in § 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights). 
However, until now, this modernisation initiative has remained 
theoretical9. 
Though it cannot be denied that Title II of the Constitution has been 
modified to some extent (e.g.: the addition of specific children’s rights, the 
right to integrity, the abolition of capital punishment, etc.), the modernisation 
proposed by the two constitutionalists would have been particularly 
interesting in relation to the ambit of religious freedom and religious 
autonomy as they apply to current social and religious realities. However, no 
revision of Articles 19, 20 and 21 has been made since 1831. 
B. The Scope of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 
1. Religious Freedom and Religious Autonomy 
It is well known that, since 1950, Article 9 § 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights has guaranteed freedom of religion by 
providing that « everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes a person’s freedom to change his religion or 
belief and freedom, either alone or jointly with others and in public or private, 
to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance ».  
Even if it is not expressly stated, Article 9 of the Convention does not 
only protect freedom of thought, conscience and religion, but also religious 
autonomy. Frequently, the European Court of Human Rights reiterates that 
« religious communities traditionally and universally exist in the form of 
organised structures. Where the organisation of the religious community is at 
issue, Article 9 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of Article 
11, which safeguards associations against unjustified State interference. (…) 
                                                
7 See: Doc. parl., Ch. repr., sess. ord. 2004-2005, n° 2304/1. 
8 See: Doc. parl., Ch. repr., sess. ord. 2004-2005, n° 2304/1. 
9 On that topic, see also: E. BREMS, « Vers des clauses transversales en matière de 
droits et libertés dans la Constitution belge ? », Rev. trim. D.H., 2007, pp. 351-383. 
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The autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for 
pluralism in a democratic society and is an issue at the very heart of the 
protection which Article 9 affords. It directly concerns not only the 
organisation of these communities as such but also the effective enjoyment 
of the right to freedom of religion by all their active members. Were the 
organisational life of the community not protected by Article 9, all other 
aspects of the individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable »10. 
2. Forum Externum v. Forum Internum 
It is important to underline the fact that the freedom of thought, 
freedom of conscience and freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 9 § 1 
have dual aspects. More precisely, Article 9 § 1 « does not only protect inner 
convictions and beliefs (so-called forum internum) but also the expression of 
these convictions and beliefs (so-called forum externum) »11. The 
fundamental difference between those two expressions of freedom relates to 
the admissibility of the State’s interferences in the terms of Article 9 § 2 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Interferences are only possible 
within the forum externum, whereas the forum internum is an absolute right 
that can never be limited by the State. This is peculiar to Article 9 and does 
not feature in Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention. This has been clarified 
by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment Kokkinakis v. 
Greece on 25 May 1993: « The fundamental nature of the rights guaranteed 
in Article 9 para. 1 (art. 9-1) is also reflected in the wording of the paragraph 
providing for limitations on them. Unlike the second paragraphs of Articles 8, 
10 and 11 (art. 8-2, art. 10-2, art, 11-2) which cover all the rights mentioned 
in the first paragraphs of those Articles (art. 8-1, art. 10-1, art. 11-1), that of 
Article 9 (art. 9-1) refers only to “freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief”. 
In so doing, it recognises that in democratic societies, in which several 
religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to 
place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the 
various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected »12. 
Norman Doe explains that « in line with Strasbourg jurisprudence on 
Article 9 ECHR, national laws in Europe make a clear distinction between 
the right to hold and change religious beliefs, which is an absolute right, and 
                                                
10 E.Ct.H.R., Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000, § 62; E.Ct.H.R., 
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 13 December 2001, § 
118; E.Ct.H.R., Sindicatul « Păstorul cel Bun » v. Romania, 9 July 2013, § 136. 
11 R. UERPMANN-WITTZACK, « Personal Rights and the Prohibition of Discrimination », 
in European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,  D. Ehlers (dir.), De Gruyter 
Textbook, 2007, p. 78. 
12 E.Ct.H.R., Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 33. 
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the right to manifest religious beliefs, which is qualified »13. In Belgium, a 
short caveat must be provided to this affirmation, in the sense that this 
distinction is not expressly included in the law sensu stricto or in the 
Constitution but comes – as we will see14 – from the « praetorian method » 
used by the Constitutional Court.    
3. Conditions of Interferences 
Interferences into religious freedom and religious autonomy are only 
accepted by the European Court of Human Rights in the presence of three 
conditions fixed by the Convention to avoid any arbitrary intervention of the 
State.  
First, the interference must be prescribed by law. This « rule of law 
test » is « not, however, confined to domestic legal processes and includes 
more abstract or general assumptions about the requirements of the “rule of 
law”, a basic Council of Europe idea »15. In other words, the concept of 
« law » need not be interpreted in its formal sense. Regularly, the European 
Court of Human Rights « reiterates its settled case law affirming that the 
expression “prescribed by law” requires first that the impugned measure 
should have a basis in domestic law. It also refers to the quality of the law in 
question, requiring that it be accessible to the persons concerned and 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable them – if need be, with 
appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail and to 
regulate their conduct »16.  
Second, the interference must pursue a legitimate aim. An exhaustive 
list of legitimate aims is provided by Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. More 
precisely, limitations to freedom of religion are only admitted if they serve the 
interests of public safety, the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Third, the interference must be necessary in a democratic society. 
This third condition is the vaguest, most complex and open-textured of the 
three. This is also true for limitations to Articles 8, 10 and 11. Concerning the 
freedom of religion, it is important to underline that in its case law, the 
European Court of Human Rights regularly reiterates that « as protected by 
                                                
13 N. DOE, Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative Introduction, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011, p. 42. 
14 See infra section 2. 
15 S. GREER, The exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 1997, p. 9. 
16 See among others: E.Ct.H.R. (GC), Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, 13 
February 2003; E.Ct.H.R. (GC), Bayatyan v. Armenia, 7 July 2011, § 113. 
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Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention. 
It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to 
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a 
precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The 
pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly 
won over the centuries, depends on it. That freedom entails, inter alia, 
freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to 
practise a religion »17. 
The analysis which follows will demonstrate how this triptych has 
influenced the Constitutional Court in its development of the so-called 
« conciliatory method » (méthode concilatoire18) when interpreting 
restrictions to freedom of religion and religious autonomy. 
2. The Status of the European Convention on Human Rights in Belgian 
Constitutional Law 
As Dean Spielmann has highlighted, « the Belgian Constitution does 
not contain a provision regarding the relationship between international and 
national law. In Belgium, the status of the Convention as superior law has 
had long tradition since the ruling of the Cour de Cassation in Fromagerie 
Franco-Suisse “Le Ski” of 27 May 1971 deciding that international law 
prevails over domestic law »19.  
Even though the conformity of a law to the European Convention on 
Human Rights cannot be directly controlled by the Belgian Constitutional 
Court – because the Convention is not included in the « bloc de 
constitutionnalité » –, it has had an important place in the case law of the 
Court since its beginning. Indeed, « the Belgian Constitutional Court, 
formerly the Cour d’Arbitrage, has since its creation in 1984 insisted on strict 
                                                
17 See among others: E.Ct.H.R., Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, 18 February 
1999, § 34; E.Ct.H.R., Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 31; E.Ct.H.R., Refah 
Partisi and Others v. Turkey, 13 February 2003, § 90. 
18 On that method, see: M. VERDUSSEN, Justice constitutionnelle, Bruxelles, Larcier, 
2012, pp. 132-138. See also: H. SIMONART and M. VERDUSSEN, « La réforme de la 
Cour d’arbitrage et la protection des droits fondamentaux », R.B.D.C., 2000, p. 189 ; 
X. DELGRANGE, « De l’ensemble indissociable à l’interprétation conciliante », in Le 
droit international et européen des droits de l’homme devant le juge national, S. van 
Drooghenbroeck (dir.), Bruxelles, Larcier, 2014, pp. 150-152. 
19 D. SPIELMANN, « Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Constitutional systems in Europe », in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law,  M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (dir.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012, p. 1241. 
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observance of the provisions of the Convention and the interpretations given 
by the ECtHR »20. More precisely, as explained by Patricia Popelier, 
« originally the Court of Arbitration’s only mandate was the supervision of the 
division of powers between the federation and the federated entities. In 1989 
however every person with justifiable interest was given access to the Court 
and its competence was extended to the review of Statutes against the 
equality and non-discrimination principles (Articles 10-11 Belgian 
Constitution) and the rights and freedoms concerning education (Article 24 
Belgian Constitution). (…). As the Court accepts that Articles 10-11 of the 
Constitution are combined with other rules and legal principles, it gives 
protection against Statutes which violate human rights laid down in the 
constitution or international treaties »21.  
This affirmation has become even stronger since the introduction in 
2009 of paragraph 4 to Article 26 of the Special Act of 6 January 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court. Pursuant to this new paragraph, « where it is invoked 
before a court of law that a statute, decree or rule referred to in Article 134 of 
the Constitution infringes a fundamental right which is guaranteed in an 
entirely or partly similar manner by a provision of Title II of the Constitution 
and by a provision of European or international law, said court of law shall 
first refer the question of compatibility with the provision of Title II of the 
Constitution to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling. Where only 
the infringement of the provision of European or international law is invoked 
before the court of law, said court of law shall, even of its own motion, 
investigate whether Title II of the Constitution contains an entirely or partly 
similar provision. These obligations shall not prejudice the right of the court 
of law, at the same time or at a later date, to refer a question to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling ».  
In other words, this paragraph gives priority to the constitutional 
procedure by obliging22 the a quo judge to first refer the question of 
                                                
20 D. SPIELMANN, op. cit., note 19, p. 1241. 
21 P. POPELIER, « Belgium. The supremacy dilemma: the Belgian Constitutional Court 
caught between the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice », in Human rights protection in the European legal order: The interaction 
between European and the national courts, P. Popelier, C. Van de Heyning and P. 
Van Nuffel (eds.), Cambridge/Antwerp/Porland, Intersentia, 2011, pp. 150-151.  
22 However, four exceptions can be invoked to avoid referring the question of 
compatibility to the Constitutional Court. More precisely, Article 26, § 4, sub. 2, 
provides that: « Notwithstanding the first paragraph, the obligation to refer a 
preliminary question to the Constitutional Court shall not apply:  
1° in the cases referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 [of Article 26];  
2° if the court of law finds that the provision of Title II of the Constitution has 
manifestly not been infringed;  
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compatibility to the Constitutional Court when the invoked violation concerns 
a right protected both by a provision of European law – whether embodied in 
the European Convention on Human Rights or elsewhere – or international 
law and by the provisions of Title II of the Constitution. 
Even though compliance with the European Convention is not 
included in the « bloc de constitutionnalité », the Constitutional Court has 
created a « praetorian method » called the « conciliatory method » (méthode 
conciliatoire) in which the Court analyses Articles of the Constitution in light 
of the corresponding provision of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. As explained by Marc Bossuyt and Willem Verrijdt « in this judgment, 
the Court considers all analogous constitutional and treaty rights to form an 
“inextricable unity” (ensemble indissociable). Nevertheless, the formal 
reference provision is still a constitutional right, because the Court cannot 
directly examine whether a provision of international or European law has 
been violated. Examples of such analogous rights include the right to 
privacy, the freedom of expression and the protection of property »23, but 
also the freedom of religion, the freedom of association, etc.  
Thanks to the so-called « conciliatory method », the Belgian 
Constitutional Court has partly « corrected » the lack of modernity of Title II 
of the Constitution and has endorsed the content of the Strasbourg case law, 
even though the European Convention on Human Right is not part of the 
« bloc de constitutionnalité ».  
3. Concrete Applications of the Influence of Strasbourg Case Law on 
Belgian Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Ambit of Religious 
Freedom and Religious Autonomy 
We propose here to analyse three clear illustrations of the use of the 
so-called « conciliatory method » by the Belgian Constitutional Court in the 
ambit of religious freedom and religious autonomy. The first one relates to 
the renewing of the representative bodies of Islam (A); the second one 
                                                                                                              
3° if the court of law finds that it appears from a judgment delivered by an 
international court of law that the provision of European or international law has 
manifestly been infringed; 4° if the court of law finds that it appears from a judgment 
delivered by the Constitutional Court that the provision of Title II of the Constitution 
has manifestly been infringed ».  
23 M. BOSSUYT and W. VERRIJDT, « The Full Effect of EU Law and of Constitutional 
Review in Belgium and France after the Melki Judgment », European Constitutional 
Law Review, 2011, p. 358. See also: P. POPELIER, « Belgium. The supremacy 
dilemma: the Belgian Constitutional Court caught between the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice », op. cit., note 21, p. 155. 
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focuses on the « burqa ban law » (B) and the third one deals with children’s 
obligation to follow religious and non-confessional courses in State schools 
(C). 
A. Decision 148/2005 of 28 September 2005: « Muslim Executive of 
Belgium » Case 
On 28 September 2005, the Belgian Constitutional Court had to 
decide whether the Law of 20 July 2004 that had created a Commission in 
charge of renewing the bodies representing Islam complied with Articles 19 
to 21 of the Belgian Constitution read together with Articles 9 and 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights24.    
In its decision, the Constitutional Court expressly refers to the Hassan 
and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria case in the European Court of Human Rights, 
citing at B.5.2 that « freedom to manifest one’s religion, alone and in private, 
or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those whose 
faith one shares. Religious communities traditionally and universally exist in 
the form of organised structures. Participation in the life of the community is 
thus a manifestation of one’s religion, protected by Article 9 of the 
Convention »25. 
The Hassan and Tchaouch case is particularly interesting in relation to 
the replacement of the leadership of a religious organisation and, more 
generally, in relation to the collective expression of freedom of religion. At § 
84 of its judgment, the European Court of Human Rights « reiterates its 
settled case law according to which the expressions “prescribed by law” and 
“in accordance with the law” in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention not only 
require that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, 
but also refer to the quality of the law in question. The law should be both 
adequately accessible and foreseeable (…). For domestic law to meet these 
requirements it must afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary 
interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the 
Convention ». Specifically, according to the Court, the relevant law did not 
provide any substantive criteria on the basis of which the State authorities 
could register religious denominations and changes of their leadership in 
circumstances where internal divisions and conflicting claims for legitimacy 
existed (§ 85). Therefore, the European Court of Human Rights found that 
Bulgaria had violated Article 9 of the Convention26. 
                                                
24 C. const. (Belgium), n°148/2005, 28 September 2005. 
25 This affirmation is taken directly from § 60 and § 62 of E.Ct.H.R, Hassan and 
Tchaouch v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000. 
26 But also Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






































































                        D
ocum











Stéphanie Wattier                      R.I.E.J., 2016.77  
 307 
In Decision 148/2005, the Belgian Constitutional Court also 
emphasises the fact that Article 24 (religious or moral education) and Article 
181 (funding of recognised religious and non-confessional organisations) of 
the Constitution imply that the State can require that all recognised religions 
provide, as a minimum, the structure enabling them to appoint a 
spokesperson in their relations with public authorities. According to the 
Constitutional Court, by creating a Commission in charge of renewing the 
bodies representing Islam, the legislator’s act only relates to concretising the 
recognition and public funding of Islam. In that sense, the Court judged that 
the legislator’s goal was not to place conditions upon the exercise of 
freedom of religion27.  
Given the absence of structure in Islam in this respect, the Court held 
that the legislator had legitimately created a Commission in charge of 
renewing the representative bodies28. The Court concluded that the State 
had not violated the right to freedom of religion. 
B. Decision 145/2012 of 6 December 2012: « Burqa Ban Law » 
On 6 December 2012, the Belgian Constitutional Court29 had to 
decide whether the Law of 1 June 2011 « prohibiting the wearing of any 
clothing which totally or mainly conceals the face » respected the applicants’ 
right to freedom of religion (Article 19 of the Belgian Constitution and Article 
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, read together)30.  
This Law inserted the following new Article 563bis into the Criminal 
Code: « Persons who, unless otherwise provided by law, appear in a place 
that is accessible to the public with their faces completely or partially 
                                                
27 C. const. (Belgium), n°148/2005, 28 September 2005, B.5.4. 
28 C. const. (Belgium), n°148/2005, 28 September 2005, B.7.4. 
29 C. const. (Belgium), n°145/2012, 6 December 2012. On that judgment, see among 
others: L.-L. CHRISTIANS, S. MINETTE and S. WATTIER, « Le visage du sujet de droit: la 
burqa entre religion et sécurité », J.T., 2013, pp. 234-245 ; X. DELGRANGE and M. EL 
BERHOUMI, « Pour vivre ensemble, vivons dévisagés : le voile intégral sous le regard 
des juges constitutionnels belge et français », note sous Cons. const. fr., 7 octobre 
2010 et C. const., n° 145/2012 du 6 décembre 2012, Rev. trim. D.H., 2014, pp. 639-
665. See also: F. KUTY, « L’article 563bis du Code pénal ou l’interdiction de 
dissimuler son visage dans les lieux accessibles au public », J.T., 2012, pp. 81-89 ; 
L.-L. CHRISTIANS, S. MINETTE, et S. WATTIER, « Cour constitutionnelle et préjudice 
religieux : la preuve du caractère absolu des convictions », note sous C. const., n° 
148/2011 du 5 octobre 2011, C.D.P.K., 2011, pp. 443-451; X. DELGRANGE, « La 
désobéissance civile, seul recours effectif contre la loi? », note sous C. const., n° 
148/2011 du 5 octobre 2011, J.T., 2011, pp. 709-712. 
30 Other human rights were invoked by the applicants (freedom of expression, right to 
privacy, human dignity, etc.) but we limit our comments to freedom of religion. 
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covered or hidden, such as not to be identifiable, shall be liable to a fine of 
between fifteen and twenty-five euros and imprisonment of between one and 
seven days, or only one of those sanctions. However, paragraph 1 hereof 
shall not concern persons who are present in a place that is accessible to 
the public with their faces completely or partially covered or hidden where 
this is provided for by employment regulations or by an administrative 
ordinance in connection with festive events »31. 
In its decision of 6 December 2012, quoting the Strasbourg cases 
Pichon and Sajous v. France, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey and Mann Singh v. 
France, the Constitutional Court of Belgium emphasised that those 
constitutional and conventional articles do not protect the right to freedom of 
religion under all circumstances32. In arguing that it is necessary, in a 
democratic society, to protect the values and principles that founded the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the Constitutional Court expressly 
cites § 108 of the Leyla Sahin’s case: « Pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic society”. Although 
individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, 
democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always 
prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper 
treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant 
position (…). Pluralism and democracy must also be based on dialogue and 
a spirit of compromise necessarily entailing various concessions on the part 
of individuals or groups of individuals which are justified in order to maintain 
and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society (…). Where these 
“rights and freedoms” are themselves among those guaranteed by the 
Convention or its Protocols, it must be accepted that the need to protect 
them may lead States to restrict other rights or freedoms likewise set forth in 
the Convention. It is precisely this constant search for a balance between 
the fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes the foundation of 
a “democratic society” (…) »33. 
Quoting Manoussakis and a. v. Greece, Hassan and Tchaouch v. 
Bulgaria and Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, the Constitutional Court 
also emphasises the fact that the State cannot make any judgment on the 
legitimacy of beliefs34.  
                                                
31 This traduction of new Article 563bis of the Criminal Code comes from: E.Ct.H.R. 
(GC), S.A.S. v. France of 1 July 2014, § 41. 
32 C. const., n°145/2012, 6 December 2012, B.16.1. 
33 E.Ct.H.R., Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 10 November 2005, § 108. 
34 C. const. (Belgium), n° 145/2012,6 December 2012, B.16.3. 
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Analysing preparatory works to the Law of 1 June 2011, the 
Constitutional Court identifies three aims that justify the adoption of the Law: 
public security, equality between men and women, and a « certain 
conception of “vivre ensemble” in society »35. According to the Court, those 
aims are legitimate aims which fall within the category of Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights that are the protection of public 
order and public security and the protection of the rights of others36. By 
reasoning this way, the Constitutional Court clearly applies the « conciliatory 
method » and, therefore, in a way, remedies the lack of an interference 
clause in Article 19 of the Belgian Constitution.  
In relation to the necessity and proportionality criteria, the Court again 
analysed the legislator’s preparatory works and held that the Law serves 
public security but also a « certain conception of “vivre ensemble” in 
society »37.  
Finally, the Court concluded that the Belgian State had not violated 
the freedom of religion. 
To complete the analysis of the Belgian « burqa ban law », it is 
particularly interesting to note that on the date of the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment, France was the only other European country to have adopted a 
similar legislation. More precisely, the French Law had been adopted on 11 
October 2010. As reaction to that prohibition, a French national who 
described herself as a « devout Muslim » wearing the burqa and niqab made 
an application to the European Court of Human Rights. Quite logically, 
Belgium became a third-party to the case before the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
In its judgment of 1 July 201438, the European Court of Human Rights 
pays particular attention to the concept of « living together » (« vivre 
                                                
35 C. const. (Belgium), n° 145/2012,6 December 2012, B. 17. 
36 Ibid., B. 18. 
37 C. const. (Belgium), n° 145/2012,6 December 2012, B.17. 
38 Regarding this decision, see among others: N. RENUART, « Brevet de 
conventionnalité pour l’interdiction du port du voile intégral dans l’espace public », 
note sous Cour eur. dr. h. (GC), S.A.S. c. France, 1 juillet 2014, C.D.P.K., 2014, pp. 
440-450 ; E. HERRERA CEBALLOS, La prohibición del velo integral en espacios 
públicos: La sentencia del TEDH (Gran Sala) en el asunto S.A.S. contra Francia, de 
1 de julio de 2014, Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del 
Estado, 36, 2014; V. CAMARERO SUÁREZ,  »La Sentencia del TEDH en el caso S.A.S. 
c. Francia: un análisis crítico », Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho 
Eclesiástico del Estado, 37, 2015,; G. GONZALEZ et G. HAARSCHER, « Consécration 
jésuitique d’une exigence fondamentale de la civilité démocratique ? Le voile intégral 
sous le regard des juges de la Cour européenne », note sous Cour eur. dr. h. (GC), 
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ensemble ») which was the basis of both French and Belgian legislation 
banning the burqa and niqab. In France, the report of the National Assembly 
on wearing the full-face veil in national territory dated January 2010 – which 
contains a total of 658 pages – clearly considers that the « full-face veil 
infringes the notion of “vivre ensemble” »39. So, originally, the concept of 
« vivre ensemble » was created by the French government emphasising that 
« voluntary and systematic concealment of the face is problematic because 
it is quite simply incompatible with the fundamental requirements of “living 
together” in French society »40. Then, this notion was taken up by the 
Belgian legislator and affirmed by the Belgian Constitutional Court, which 
held that « the individuality of every subject of law (sujet de droit) in a 
democratic society is inconceivable without his or her face, a fundamental 
element thereof, being visible. (…) [I]t was entitled to take the view that the 
creation of human relationships, being necessary for living together in 
society, was rendered impossible by the presence in the public sphere, 
which quintessentially concerned the community, of persons who concealed 
this fundamental element of their individuality »41. 
Even if the « vivre ensemble » is not a legal concept that would be 
listed among the legitimate aims of paragraph 2 of Articles 8 and 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights to justify a limitation to freedom, it is 
worth noting that the Court finds that the « burqa ban law » can be regarded 
« as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the 
conditions of “living together” as an element of the “protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others” »42 
                                                                                                              
S.A.S. c. France, 1 juillet 2014, Rev. trim. D.H., 2015, pp. 219-233; P. 
DUCOULOMBIER, « Le port de la burqa et du niqab interdit dans l'espace public. Tenue 
correcte exigée », Observations sous l’arrêt CEDH, gr. ch., 1 juillet 2014, S.A.S. 
c/France, Rev. trim. D.H., 2015, pp. 95-116. 
39 Rapport d’information du 26 janvier 2010 de l’Assemblée nationale sur la pratique 
du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national, p. 87, available on 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/ (free translation). 
40 See : Exposé des motifs, Assemblée nationale de France, projet de loi n° 2520 (10 
May 2010), quoted by E.Ct.H.R. (GC), S.A.S. v. France,1 July 2014, § 25. 
41 C. const. (Belgium), n° 145/2012, 6 December 2012, B.21. 
42 E.Ct.H.R. (GC), S.A.S. v. France of 1 July 2014, § 157. However, this point of view 
is not shared by all the judges of the Court. Some of them have strong reservations 
about this approach. It is important to mention here that in its judgment S.A.S v. 
France, the Court holds by fifteen votes to two that there has been no violation of 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. More precisely, one dissenting opinion is 
formulated by two judges (Judges Nußberger and Jäderblom). According to those 
two judges, « the very general concept of “living together” does not fall directly under 
any of the rights and freedoms guaranteed within the Convention » and that is the 
reason why they doubt that « Law prohibiting the concealment of one’s face in public 
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C. Decision 34/2015 of 12 March 2015: Religious and Non-
Confessional Courses in Public Schools 
On 12 March 2015, the Constitutional Court of Belgium had to rule on 
a preliminary reference submitted by the Council of State relating to the 
obligation for children under 18 years old going to State schools to receive 
religious or moral education. This obligation is contained in Article 8 of the 
Law of 29 May 1959 (the so-called « Loi du Pacte scolaire ») and in Article 5 
of the Decree of the French Community defining neutrality of education.  
In its decision, the Constitutional Court noted that Article 24 § 3 sub. 2 
sets out the statutory rather than the constitutional obligation, that: « All 
pupils of school age have the right to moral or religious education at the 
community’s expense ». The Court stated that pursuant to Article 24, § 3, of 
the Constitution, everyone has the right to education in accordance with the 
fundamental rights and freedoms and that these rights include the right of 
parents to ensure that such education and teaching aligns with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions, guaranteed by Article 2 of the First 
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights43. 
In order to clarify the scope of Article 24 § 3 of the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court makes express reference to the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on Article 2 of the First Additional Protocol. According to the 
European Court of Human Rights, « Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not 
permit a distinction to be drawn between religious instruction and other 
subjects. It enjoins the State to respect parents’ convictions, be they 
religious or philosophical, throughout the entire State education 
programme »44. The European Court also considers there is an « obligation 
under the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, which gives 
parents the right to demand from the State respect for their religious and 
philosophical convictions in the teaching of religion » and finds that « where 
a Contracting State includes religious instruction in the curriculum for study, 
it is then necessary, in so far as possible, to avoid a situation where pupils 
face a conflict between the religious education given by the school and the 
religious or philosophical convictions of their parents »45. 
                                                                                                              
places pursues any legitimate aim under Article 8 § 2 or Article 9 § 2 of the 
Convention ». 
43 C. const. (Belgium), n°34/2015, 12 March 2015, B.5.1. 
44 E.Ct.H.R. (GC), Folgero and others v. Norway,9 October 2007, § 84; E.Ct.H.R., 
Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, 9 October 2007, § 48, quoted by C. const. 
(Belgium), n°34/2015, 12 March 2015, B.5.2. 
45 E.Ct.H.R., Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, 9 October 2007, § 71; E.Ct.H.R., 
Mansur Yalçin and others v. Turkey, 16 September 2014, § 72, quoted by C. const. 
(Belgium), n°34/2015, 12 March 2015, B.5.3. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






































































                        D
ocum











 R.I.E.J., 2016.77                                        The « added value » of the ECHR  
 
 312 
Noting that the current system in the French Community only 
authorises parents and children to choose between « courses of religion » 
and « moral courses inspired by free spirit », the Constitutional Court 
considers that the French Community only offers « orientated » courses and, 
therefore, does not comply with the Strasbourg case law. According to the 
Constitutional Court, it must be possible for the students to be exempted 
from religious and moral lessons46. 
In conclusion, the French Community will have to change its system in 
order to comply with the decision of the Constitutional Court and, in the 
meantime, in relation to the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. In that sense, decision 34/2015 of 12 March 2015 constitutes a 
paradigmatic illustration of the influence of Strasbourg case law on Belgian 
constitutional law. 
4. A Counter-Example: The Jurisprudence of the Belgian Court of 
Cassation and Council of State on the Principle of Religious Autonomy 
Analysing the jurisprudence of the Belgian Court of Cassation and 
Council of State relating to the principle of religious autonomy enables us to 
understand how the Constitutional Court is more greatly influenced by the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This is especially true 
concerning respect for the rights of the defence in the proceedings for the 
revocation of religious ministers (A) as compared to the Strasbourg case law 
(B) and its « absence » of influence on the jurisprudence of the Belgian 
Court of Cassation and Council of State (C).  
A. The Belgian Court of Cassation and Council of State’s Case Law 
on the Revocation of Religious Ministers 
As explained by Rik Torfs, « traditionally, the control exercised by 
secular courts remains exclusively formal, which means that the civil judge 
only has the right to determine whether a challenged decision has been 
taken by the competent ecclesiastical authority. This was a generally 
accepted approach throughout the nineteenth century, a tendency that was 
confirmed by the Cour de Cassation, the Belgian Supreme Court, in 
1975 »47. 
In other words, according to the Belgian Court of Cassation, a civil 
court can never rule on whether a decision to revoke a religious minister has 
been adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence by the religious 
                                                
46 C. const. (Belgium), n°34/2015, 12 March 2015, B.7.1. 
47 R. TORFS, « Church Autonomy in Belgium », op. cit., note 4, p. 611. 
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authority. In this sense, the Court of Cassation interprets Article 21 of the 
Constitution – that contains a general principle relating to the separation of 
Church and State – in a very strict way. 
This nineteenth-century interpretation has never been changed and 
has even been upheld by the Court of Cassation since 1975, in its decision 
of 3 June 199948. 
Like the Court of Cassation, the Belgian Council of State adopts a 
very strict interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution and has emphasised 
the importance of the principle of separation between the state sphere and 
religious sphere on several occasions49.  
In relation to the revocation of religious ministers, the Council of State 
also considers that civil courts can never rule on whether a religious decision 
to revoke a religious minister has been made in accordance with the rights of 
the defence50. 
                                                
48 This decision of 1999 concerned the famous case of « Père Samuel ». The Court 
of Cassation had previously adopted a decision in the same sense on 20 October 
1994. We intentionally limit our analysis on this case which has already been 
extensively commented upon. Among others, see: F. RIGAUX, « Le respect des droits 
fondamentaux par les institutions non étatiques », note sous Cass., 20 octobre 1994, 
R.C.J.B., pp. 124-129 ; L.-L. CHRISTIANS, « L’autonomie des systèmes religieux : 
réaffirmation d’un principe », J.L.M.B., 1995, p. 507; H. VUYE, « Hoe gescheiden zijn 
Kerk en Staat? Interpretatiemogelijkheden omtrent art. 21 van de Grondwet », R. 
Cass., 1995, pp. 49-56; S. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, obs. sous Cass. (1ère ch.), 20 
octobre 1994, in Droit international des droits de l’homme,O. De Schutter and  S. van 
Drooghenbroeck (dir.), Bruxelles, Larcier, 1999, pp. 205-213. On the judgment of 3 
June 1999, see among others: K. MARTENS, « Het Hof van Cassatie en de 
interpretatie van artikel 21 G.W.: de verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat dan toch niet 
op nieuwe wegen?, C.D.P.K., 2000, pp. 215-218; H. VUYE, « Nogmaals: hoe 
gescheiden zijn Kerk en Staat? Over de bevoegdheid van de rechter bij beslissingen 
tot benoeming of afzetting van bedienaren van de eredienst in het licht van art. 21 
Grondwet », R. Cass., 2000, pp. 105-110; R. TORFS, « Religieuze gemeenschappen 
en interne autonomie. Fluwelen evolutie? », Jaarboek Mensenrechten, 1998-00, pp. 
256-264. 
49 Among others, see Council of State (Belgium), n° 16.993, 29 April 1975, Van 
Grembergen; Council of State (Belgium), n° 25.995, 20 December 1985, Mgr Van 
Peteghem. 
50 Among others, see Council of State (Belgium), n° 211.300, 16 February 2011, 
Toubali, obs. S. WATTIER, « La “séparation de l’Eglise et de l’Etat” : un principe 
réaffirmé par le Conseil d’Etat », J.T., 2011, pp. 775-778, obs. K. VAN GEYT, « De 
religieuze overheid en het ontslag van haar bedienaren. Soeverein in een slinkend 
rechtsgebied?  », R.W., 2012, pp. 61-65. 
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B. The Strasbourg Case Law on the Civil Effects of Religious 
Decisions 
In the last few years, several Belgian legal commentators51 have 
begun to argue that civil courts could possibly rule on whether decisions 
made by religious bodies comply with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, including in relation to Article 6 that contains the rights of the 
defence. According to those theories, the position of the Belgian Court of 
Cassation and Council of State has to become less strict with regard to the 
application of religious autonomy to the proceedings relating to the 
revocation of religious ministers. The authors of those theories essentially 
base their analyses on the Pellegrini v. Italy case of 20 July 2001 in the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
In that instance, the applicant (Mrs Maria Grazia Pellegrini) married 
her husband (Mr Gigliozzi) in 1962 in a religious ceremony which also took 
effect in civil law (matrimonio concordatario). In February 1987, she 
petitioned the Rome District Court for judicial separation, which granted her 
demand in 1990 and ordered her husband to pay her maintenance every 
month52. In the meantime, she was summoned by the Lazio Regional 
Ecclesiastical Court of the Rome Vicariate on 1 December 1987 to answer 
questions about her matrimonial case. Her husband had asked for the 
annulment of their marriage on the ground of consanguinity, based on the 
fact that the applicant’s mother and Mr Gigliozzi’s father were cousins. On 
10 December 1987, following a summary hearing (praetermissis 
solemnitatibus processus ordinarii) under Article 1688 of the Code of Canon 
Law, the religious Court annulled the marriage on the ground of 
consanguinity. The applicant introduced an appeal to the Roman Rota. She 
alleged « a breach of her defence rights and of the adversarial principle on 
account of the fact that she had been summoned to appear before the 
Ecclesiastical Court without being informed in advance either of the 
application to have the marriage annulled or the reasons for that application. 
She had therefore not prepared any defence and, furthermore, had not been 
assisted by a lawyer »53. However, the Roman Rota affirmed the decision to 
annul the marriage. In November 1989, the Rota informed Mr Gigliozzi that 
                                                
51 See in particular: H. VUYE, « Liberté des cultes : la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme et la Cour de cassation sur des longueurs d’ondes différentes? », C.D.P.K., 
2004, pp. 14-16; M.-F. RIGAUX, « La séparation de l’Eglise et de l’Etat : une frontière 
difficile à tracer », note sous Liège, 12 juin 2007, J.T., 2007, p. 781; F. AMEZ, « Le 
régime des cultes sous la pression de la jurisprudence de Strasbourg », note sous 
Mons, 23 décembre 2008,  J.L.M.B., 2009, pp. 706-712. 
52 E.Ct.H.R, Pellegrini v. Italy, 20 July 2001, §§ 12-13.  
53 E.Ct.H.R, Pellegrini v. Italy, 20 July 2001, § 18. 
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the annulment decision « which had become enforceable by a decision of 
the superior ecclesiastical review body, had been referred to the Florence 
Court of Appeal for a declaration that it could be enforced under Italian 
law »54. 
In a November 1991 decision, the Florence Court of Appeal declared 
the annulment enforceable. The applicant appealed and alleged again that 
her defence rights had been infringed in the proceedings before the 
ecclesiastical courts. During the proceedings, she asked the Ecclesiastical 
Court to give her a copy of the relevant documents but this was refused by 
the court clerk « on the ground that the parties could receive only the 
operative provisions of the judgment, “which should be sufficient to allow 
them to exercise their defence rights” »55. In March 1995, the Italian Court of 
Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal.  
Before the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant argued 
that Article 6 of the Convention had been violated because « the Italian 
courts declared the decision of the ecclesiastical courts annulling her 
marriage enforceable at the end of proceedings in which her defence rights 
had been breached »56 . Noting that the Vatican has not ratified the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the Court of Strasbourg explains 
that its task « consists not in examining whether the proceedings before the 
ecclesiastical courts complied with Article 6 of the Convention, but whether 
the Italian courts, before authorising enforcement of the decision annulling 
the marriage, duly satisfied themselves that the relevant proceedings fulfilled 
the guarantees of Article 6. A review of that kind is required where a decision 
in respect of which enforcement is requested emanates from the courts of a 
country which does not apply the Convention. Such a review is especially 
necessary where the implications of a declaration of enforceability are of 
capital importance for the parties » 57. Examining the reasons given by the 
Florence Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation for dismissing the 
applicant’s complaints about the proceedings before the ecclesiastical 
courts, the Court affirmed that it was not satisfied with those reasons58. 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, the Italian courts did not 
consider the fact that the applicant could not have access to the evidence 
produced by her ex-husband, nor to the fact that she was not assisted by a 
lawyer before the Ecclesiastical Courts, which is contrary to Article 6 of the 
Convention.  
                                                
54 Ibid., § 23. 
55 Ibid., § 28. 
56 Ibid., § 33. 
57 Ibid., § 34. 
58 Ibid., §§ 41-44. 
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In conclusion, the Court of Strasbourg judges that « the Italian courts 
breached their duty of satisfying themselves, before authorising enforcement 
of the Roman Rota’s judgment, that the applicant had had a fair trial in the 
proceedings under canon law », and that « there has therefore been a 
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention »59. 
C. The « Lack » of Influence of the Strasbourg Case Law on the 
Jurisprudence of the Belgian Court of Cassation and Council of State 
According to legal literature, the Pellegrini v. Italy case is « a new 
approach to church autonomy »60. Moreover, as mentioned before, a part of 
the Belgian authors61 uses this Strasbourg case to claim that the Court of 
Cassation and the Council of State have to change their approach 
concerning the compliance with the rights of the defence in the religious 
proceedings relating to the revocation of religious ministers when the State’s 
courts have to deal with that issue.  
Unfortunately, since 1999, the Belgian Court of Cassation has not 
heard any new cases where the rights of the defence in religious 
proceedings relating to revocation are at issue. In that sense, it is impossible 
to evaluate the potential influence of the Pellegrini case of 2001. However, it 
is very unfortunate that the case concerning a nun revoked by her religious 
order was not referred to the Court of Cassation after the Court of Appeal of 
Mons recognised in its decision of 23 December 2008 that her defence 
rights had been violated by her religious superiors62. The Court of Appeal of 
Mons was clearly influenced by the Strasbourg case law63.  
Regarding the jurisprudence of the Council of State, the situation is 
quite different. The Council of State has considered the rights of the defence 
in religious proceedings relating to revocation several times since the 
Pellegrini case of 2001. This could have been the opportunity to follow the 
« Strasbourg example ». However, until now, the position of the Council of 
State has never evolved in this direction. The administrative court often 
repeats that there is a strict separation between Church and State and 
refuses to rule upon adherence to the rights of the defence in religious 
revocation proceedings. This view has been repeated by the Council of 
State in its decisions in 200464, 200765 and 201166.  
                                                
59 Ibid., §§ 47-48. 
60 I. CISMAS, Religious Actors and International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2014, p. 134. 
61 See in particular supra, note 41. 
62 Mons, 23 décembre 2008. 
63 On that point, see: F. AMEZ, op. cit., note 41.. 
64 Council of State (Belgium), n° 135.938, 12 October 2004, Van Butsele. 
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Conclusion 
When it was adopted in 1831, the Belgian Constitutional regime 
relating to freedom of religion and religious autonomy (Articles 19, 20, 21) 
was hailed for its modernity and its originality67. However, almost two 
centuries later, those Articles have not been changed at all. This lack of 
modernity does not concern the entire Constitution but is very conspicuous 
in relation to freedom of religion and religious autonomy.  
The Belgian Constitutional Court has been dealing with this deficiency 
using the « conciliatory method » (méthode conciliatoire) in which the Court 
analyses articles of the Constitution in the light of corresponding provisions 
in the European Convention on Human Rights. In that sense, when ruling on 
compliance with freedom of religion and religious autonomy, the Court 
enriches and modernises its reasoning by taking inspiration from the 
Strasbourg case law.  
The use of the « conciliatory method » illustrates the significant 
influence the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has on 
the reasoning of the Belgian Constitutional Court. This is especially true 
when it is compared to the jurisprudence of the Council of State on the 
application of the principle of religious autonomy in revocation proceedings. 
Despite the wishes expressed in the Belgian legal literature, the Council of 
State does not seem willing to follow the Strasbourg example.  
Although the « conciliatory method » is certainly a very positive step 
towards modernising the interpretation of the Constitution, it also diminishes 
the need to modernise the second Title of the Constitution, which has still, 





                                                                                                              
65 Council of State (Belgium), n° 177.348, 29 November 2007, Moulai and others. 
66 Council of State (Belgium), n° 211.300, 16 February 2011, Toubali. 
67 L. DE LICHTERVELDE, Le Congrès national, Bruxelles, La renaissance du livre, 1945, 
pp. 63-67. 
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